Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations

DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01366-3zbMath1520.91253OpenAlexW3202024282MaRDI QIDQ6168829

Guoqiang Tian, Darong Dai

Publication date: 11 July 2023

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01366-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) PDEs in connection with game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences (35Q91)

Related Items (1)

Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels

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