The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives

DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01437-zzbMath1520.91161OpenAlexW4308650959MaRDI QIDQ6168832

Maurice Salles

Publication date: 11 July 2023

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01437-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting
• The Bargaining Problem
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
• Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions

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