The risk of attacker behavioral learning: can attacker fool defender under uncertainty?

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-26369-9_1zbMath1529.68066MaRDI QIDQ6172036

Amulya Yadav, Thanh Hong Nguyen

Publication date: 16 August 2023

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintydeceptionsecurity gamesbehavior models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Computer security (68M25)

Cites Work

• Improving resource allocation strategies against human adversaries in security games: an extended study
• Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Security and Game Theory
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