Favouritism and corruption in procurement auctions

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2023.02.003zbMath1527.91083OpenAlexW4321378735MaRDI QIDQ6173735

Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, Sonakshi Jain

Publication date: 13 July 2023

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

social welfarebiddingBayesian Nash equilibriumcorruptionfavoritismprocurement auctionbribe

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
• Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer
• Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts
• Corruption, market quality, and entry deterrence in emerging economies

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