Strategic disclosure of random variables

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2010.08.027zbMath1208.91028OpenAlexW2163884053MaRDI QIDQ617521

Andrés Perea, Janos Flesch

Publication date: 21 January 2011

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/9b122aeb-59e0-4b98-8eac-43d01c088312

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationoptimal strategiessecretary problemlack of information on one sideMoser's problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Who solved the secretary problem
• A stochastic game of optimal stopping and order selection
• A new secretary problem with rank-based selection and cardinal payoffs
• Minimizing the expected rank with full information
• What is Known About Robbins' Problem?

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