Not all strangers are the same: the impact of tolerance in Schelling games

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114065arXiv2105.02699OpenAlexW3157173435MaRDI QIDQ6175519

Alexandros A. Voudouris, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou

Publication date: 18 August 2023

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.02699

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaprice of anarchySchelling's segregation model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

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