Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.06.002zbMath1232.91200OpenAlexW3126075511MaRDI QIDQ617583

Rajiv Vohra, Roberto Serrano

Publication date: 21 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62639

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityincomplete informationincentive compatibilityapproximate implementationexact implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (9)

Mechanism design and communication networks ⋮ Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments ⋮ A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies ⋮ Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability ⋮ Bayesian implementation with verifiable information ⋮ Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium ⋮ Rationalizable implementation ⋮ Weak implementation ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs

Cites Work

• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• Implementation in differential information economies
• A new approach to the implementation problem
• A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
• Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
• Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Bayesian Implementation
• Efficiency and Mechanisms with no Regret
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Virtual Bayesian Implementation
• Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

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