Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.06.003zbMath1232.91330OpenAlexW3124334542MaRDI QIDQ617587

Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date: 21 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23157/1/MPRA_paper_23157.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

common valueshidden informationhold-up problemhidden action

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market

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