A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.08.001zbMath1232.91038OpenAlexW2059631312MaRDI QIDQ617597

Cheng-Cheng Hu

Publication date: 21 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumNash programMas-Colell bargaining set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

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• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• The comparability of the classical and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets
• Implementation of bargaining sets via simple mechanisms
• Bargaining and bargaining sets.
• Divide-and-permute
• A noncooperative interpretation of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games