Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.11.014zbMath1232.91044OpenAlexW2016103439MaRDI QIDQ617608

Jian Zhai, Zhiwei Cui

Publication date: 21 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.11.014

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic stabilityadaptive learning dynamics in gamesescape dynamicsiterative cycle decomposition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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