A representative individual from Arrovian aggregation of parametric individual utilities

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.10.002zbMath1232.91193OpenAlexW2103998286WikidataQ57542988 ScholiaQ57542988MaRDI QIDQ617616

Frederik S. Herzberg

Publication date: 21 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2316447

zbMATH Keywords

nonstandard analysisultraproductultrafilterArrovian social choicerepresentative individual

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• On Arrow-type impossibility theorems with infinite individuals and infinite alternatives
• Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle
• Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions
• The consistency of welfare judgements with a representative consumer
• Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras
• The representative agent model of probabilistic social choice
• A further note on Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Model theory
• Ultraproducts and aggregation
• WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
• The Power of the Ultrafilter Theorem
• Some applications of the notions of forcing and generic sets
• Non-standard analysis
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