Nonseparable preferences and optimal social security systems

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.01.012zbMath1203.91190OpenAlexW2162279941MaRDI QIDQ617667

Borys Grochulski, Narayana R. Kocherlakota

Publication date: 13 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13362.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

nonseparable preferencesprivate skill shocksretrospecitive taxationsocial security systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (1)

On the redistributive power of pensions

Cites Work

• Risky human capital and deferred capital income taxation
• Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation
• Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation

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