On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
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Publication:6176739
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.005zbMath1521.91087MaRDI QIDQ6176739
Publication date: 23 August 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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