A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
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Publication:6176744
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.003zbMath1521.91250OpenAlexW4384207628MaRDI QIDQ6176744
Publication date: 23 August 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.003
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
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