Polytope-form games and index/degree theories for extensive-form games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.001zbMath1521.91026arXiv2201.02098OpenAlexW4384156234MaRDI QIDQ6176749

Lucas Pahl

Publication date: 23 August 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.02098

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryalgebraic topologyindex theoryrefinements of Nash equilibriastructure of equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

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