Unique stable matchings
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Publication:6176757
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.010zbMath1521.91247arXiv2106.12977OpenAlexW4385287534MaRDI QIDQ6176757
Gregory Gutin, Anders Yeo, Philip R. Neary
Publication date: 23 August 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.12977
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