Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
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Publication:617676
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.03.014zbMath1203.91070OpenAlexW2104057709MaRDI QIDQ617676
Hitoshi Matsushima, Koichi Miyazaki, Nobuyuki Yagi
Publication date: 13 January 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.014
characterizationhidden informationfull surplus extractionlinking mechanismsmultitask agencyno side payments
Related Items (2)
Approximate implementation in Markovian environments ⋮ Corrigendum to: ``Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
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