Information acquisition and full surplus extraction

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.003zbMath1203.91136OpenAlexW3123576996MaRDI QIDQ617680

Sushil Bikhchandani

Publication date: 13 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionmechanism designfull surplus extraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (2)

Mechanism design with information acquisition ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types

Cites Work

• The value of information for auctioneers
• Ex post implementation
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• The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
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• Information Acquisition in Auctions
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• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
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• Unnamed Item

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