Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
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Publication:617686
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.03.017zbMath1203.91129OpenAlexW3122839817MaRDI QIDQ617686
Publication date: 13 January 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repec.org/sed2005/up.5248.1106932438.pdf
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Cites Work
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- Repeated moral hazard with persistence
- A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
- Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance
- Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
- Incentives, insurance, and the variability of consumption and leisure
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