Cores of combined games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.04.004zbMath1203.91015OpenAlexW1543855593MaRDI QIDQ617687

Francis Bloch, Geoffroy de Clippel

Publication date: 13 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamescoreadditivityissue linkagemulti-issue bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks ⋮ Joint games and compatibility ⋮ Issue linkage ⋮ Cores of combined games ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency ⋮ Allocation in multi-agenda disputes: a set-valued games approach ⋮ Minimum cost spanning tree problems as value sharing problems ⋮ Linearity of the core correspondence ⋮ Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues ⋮ A note on the core of TU-cooperative games with multiple membership externalities

Cites Work

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