An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences
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Publication:617691
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.015zbMath1204.91052OpenAlexW1974134188MaRDI QIDQ617691
Publication date: 13 January 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.015
Related Items (9)
A strict expected multi-utility theorem ⋮ Scalarization methods and expected multi-utility representations ⋮ On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences ⋮ Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known ⋮ Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources ⋮ Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences ⋮ Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems ⋮ Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions ⋮ Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment
Cites Work
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- Constrained school choice
- A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom.
- WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
- Lectures on Polytopes
- Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom: A Correction
- Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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