An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.015zbMath1204.91052OpenAlexW1974134188MaRDI QIDQ617691

Gabriel D. Carroll

Publication date: 13 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.015

zbMATH Keywords

dominancePareto efficiencyordinal efficiency welfare theoremunknown preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (9)

A strict expected multi-utility theorem ⋮ Scalarization methods and expected multi-utility representations ⋮ On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences ⋮ Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known ⋮ Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources ⋮ Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences ⋮ Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems ⋮ Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions ⋮ Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment

Cites Work

• Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
• Constrained school choice
• A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem
• Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
• Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom.
• WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
• Lectures on Polytopes
• Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom: A Correction
• Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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