On replicator equations with nonlinear payoff functions defined by the Ricker models

DOI10.21494/iste.op.2021.0740MaRDI QIDQ6177231

Mansoor Saburov

Publication date: 31 August 2023

Published in: Advances in Pure and Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumevolutionarily stable strategyRicker modelreplicator equation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Stable and historic behavior in replicator equations generated by similar-order preserving mappings

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