Estimation of Discrete Games with Weak Assumptions on Information

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAC058zbMath1521.91002OpenAlexW3010548622WikidataQ114631426 ScholiaQ114631426MaRDI QIDQ6177919

Unnamed Author, Lorenzo Magnolfi

Publication date: 31 August 2023

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/134247/1/WRAP-twerp-1247-Roncoroni-2020.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

partial identificationBayes correlated equilibriumentry modelsestimation of gamessupermarket industry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Related Items (2)

Stable outcomes and information in games: an empirical framework ⋮ Information design and sensitivity to market fundamentals

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