Should pluralists be pluralists about pluralism?

DOI10.1007/s11229-021-03348-5zbMath1528.03054OpenAlexW3192528032MaRDI QIDQ6180134

Robert Paßmann

Publication date: 19 January 2024

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03348-5

zbMATH Keywords

coherencecontextualismlogical pluralismmeta-logiccorrect logicmeaning-variance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• What logical pluralism cannot be
• On the logic of demonstratives
• Logical predictivism
• On the constructive Dedekind reals
• On some Kripke complete and Kripke incomplete intermediate predicate logics
• The collapse of logical pluralism has been greatly exaggerated
• Varieties of Logic
• An intuitiomstic completeness theorem for intuitionistic predicate logic
• Logical Pluralism
• Problems for Logical Pluralism
• Completeness and incompleteness for intuitionistic logic
• On weak completeness of intuitionistic predicate logic
• Metalinguistic negotiation and logical pluralism
• Why logical pluralism?

This page was built for publication: Should pluralists be pluralists about pluralism?