Bad apples in symmetric repeated games

DOI10.3982/te5351OpenAlexW4388542674MaRDI QIDQ6180409

Alexander Wolitzky, Takuo Sugaya

Publication date: 19 January 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te5351

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesincomplete informationsymmetric gameslarge populationsfree-rider problemcommitment typespopulation dominant action

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Common learning and cooperation in repeated games
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