Conveying value via categories

DOI10.3982/TE5026arXiv2103.12804OpenAlexW3173539684MaRDI QIDQ6180411

Paula Onuchic, Debraj Ray

Publication date: 19 January 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.12804

zbMATH Keywords

heterogeneous priorsinformation designmonotonic categorization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Stochastic orders
• Monopoly and product quality
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
• Monotone persuasion
• Monopolistic Signal Provision
• Overconfidence by Bayesian-Rational Agents
• Relational communication
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
• The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk
• Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications

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