Information design in multistage games

DOI10.3982/te4769arXiv2102.13482MaRDI QIDQ6180413

Ludovic Renou, Miltiadis Makris

Publication date: 19 January 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.13482

zbMATH Keywords

revelation principlemultistage gamesinformation structurescommunication equilibriuminformation designsequential communication equilibriumBayes' correlated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited
• Robust dynamic implementation
• Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
• Optimal dynamic information provision
• REPUTATIONAL BIDDING
• Repeated Games
• Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Computational Complexity
• Multistage Games with Communication
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Sequential Information Design
• Mechanism Design With Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms
• The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games
• Rationalizability, Observability, and Common Knowledge

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