Robust contracting under double moral hazard

DOI10.3982/te4916OpenAlexW4388535687MaRDI QIDQ6180418

Unnamed Author, Gabriel D. Carroll

Publication date: 19 January 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4916

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintyrobustnessasymmetric informationprincipal-agent modeldouble-sided moral hazardlinear contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
• Calibrated Incentive Contracts
• Shared-Savings Contracts for Indirect Materials in Supply Chains: Channel Profits and Environmental Impacts
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt
• Optimal contracts with a risk‐taking agent
• Optimal Monitoring Design

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