Stability in repeated matching markets

DOI10.3982/te4898arXiv2007.03794MaRDI QIDQ6180420

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Publication date: 19 January 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.03794

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingrepeated gamesGale-Shapley

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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