Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
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Publication:6181687
DOI10.3982/ecta16846arXiv1811.03579OpenAlexW2900313146MaRDI QIDQ6181687
Publication date: 23 January 2024
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.03579
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Cites Work
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