Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information
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Publication:6183346
DOI10.1007/s00182-023-00857-0zbMath1530.91087OpenAlexW2292869772MaRDI QIDQ6183346
Indrajit Ray, Chirantan Ganguly
Publication date: 4 January 2024
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00857-0
Cites Work
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