Asymmetric majority pillage games

DOI10.1007/s00182-023-00859-yzbMath1530.91039OpenAlexW2990202015MaRDI QIDQ6183348

Colin Rowat, Naoki Yoshihara, Manfred Kerber

Publication date: 4 January 2024

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00859-y

zbMATH Keywords

corestable setspower contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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• Efficient sets are small
• Strictly monotonic multidimensional sequences and stable sets in pillage games
• A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games
• Power and efficiency in production pillage games
• Pillage and property
• Pillage games with multiple stable sets
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations
• Stable sets in majority pillage games
• Uncovered sets
• Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts
• The Farsighted Stable Set
• Rational expectations and farsighted stability
• Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set
• N‐person games in partition function form

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