Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets
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Publication:6185480
DOI10.3982/qe1955MaRDI QIDQ6185480
Siqi Pan, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kübler
Publication date: 8 January 2024
Published in: Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
game theoryinformation acquisitionlab experimentdeferred acceptanceserial dictatorshipmatching market
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Cites Work
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- Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets
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