Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games

DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00852-5zbMath1529.91013arXiv2007.06403OpenAlexW4367181421MaRDI QIDQ6187470

Shao-Fei Jiang

Publication date: 31 January 2024

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.06403

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium refinementhard evidenceverifiable disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
• Evidence disclosure and verifiability
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Sequential Equilibria
• A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory
• Community Enforcement of Trust with Bounded Memory
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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