Information spillover in multiple zero-sum games

DOI10.1007/s00182-023-00855-2zbMath1529.91010arXiv2111.01647OpenAlexW3210512827MaRDI QIDQ6187471

Lucas Pahl

Publication date: 31 January 2024

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.01647

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasioninformation spilloverBayesian repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

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