Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.017zbMath1530.91130MaRDI QIDQ6188246

Mihai Manea, Eric S. Maskin

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

damagemoney burningbilateral tradeallocation problemsBayesian mechanism designwithholding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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