Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.013zbMath1530.91165OpenAlexW4386413352MaRDI QIDQ6188256

Lucas Rentschler, Jacob M. Meyer

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.013

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitioncostly votingmandatory voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
• Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
• A theory of voting in large elections
• Rational ignorance and voting behavior
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Radio's Impact on Public Spending

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