Robust equilibria in tournaments
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Publication:6188258
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.012zbMath1530.91036MaRDI QIDQ6188258
Ruben Juarez, Lining Han, Miguel Vargas
Publication date: 11 January 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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