Ex-post implementation with interdependent values

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.09.002zbMath1530.91220arXiv2108.09580OpenAlexW3194551195MaRDI QIDQ6188260

Saurav Goyal, Aroon Narayanan

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.09580

zbMATH Keywords

ex-post implementationoptimal auctioneventual monotonicityinterdependent value auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
• Implementation in an interdependent value framework
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

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