Paying for what kind of performance? Performance pay, multitasking, and sorting in mission-oriented jobs

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.08.002zbMath1530.91285MaRDI QIDQ6188264

Michael Vlassopoulos, Mirco Tonin, K. Pun Winichakul, Daniel B. Jones

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

sortingmultitaskingperformance payprosocial motivation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Cites Work

• Who benefits from corporate social responsibility? Reciprocity in the presence of social incentives and self-selection
• The Welfare Effects of Incentive Schemes
• What Motivates Effort? Evidence and Expert Forecasts
• TESTING THE THEORY OF MULTITASKING: EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL FIELD EXPERIMENT IN CHINESE FACTORIES
• Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment

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