Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.001zbMath1530.91428OpenAlexW4386784591MaRDI QIDQ6188265

Tomohiro Koana, Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger, Matthias Bentert

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

strong stabilityweak stabilitystable roommatesmultivariate complexitysuper stabilitymultimodal preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

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