Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games
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Publication:6188266
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.09.003OpenAlexW4386813648MaRDI QIDQ6188266
Julien Manili, Emiliano Catonini, Pierpaolo Battigalli
Publication date: 11 January 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.003
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