Sharing cost of network among users with differentiated willingness to pay
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Publication:6188273
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.009zbMath1530.91251MaRDI QIDQ6188273
Publication date: 11 January 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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