Guilt aversion in (new) games: does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.004zbMath1530.91115OpenAlexW4387096113MaRDI QIDQ6188275

Giuseppe Attanasi, Claire Rimbaud, Marie Claire Villeval

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.004

zbMATH Keywords

experimentdictator gamevulnerabilityguilt aversionpsychological game theorytrust game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

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