scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7800973
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Publication:6188303
Publication date: 7 February 2024
Full work available at URL: https://applmath.cjoe.ac.cn/jweb_yysxxb/EN/Y2022/V45/I3/432
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Cites Work
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