Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: an impossibility result
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Publication:6188306
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.010zbMath1530.91242MaRDI QIDQ6188306
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Publication date: 11 January 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
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- Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
- Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
- Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb-Douglas preferences
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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