Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.002zbMath1530.91158arXiv2210.11627OpenAlexW4388915296MaRDI QIDQ6188663

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustín G. Bonifacio

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.11627

zbMATH Keywords

voting by committeesvoting by quota(generalized) median voting schemesobvious manipulationstops-onliness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Tops-only domains
• Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
• Obvious manipulations
• Obvious manipulability of voting rules
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result