Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6188666
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.003arXiv2005.05713OpenAlexW3086551450MaRDI QIDQ6188666
Yuval Heller, Christoph Kuzmics
Publication date: 11 January 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.05713
incomplete informationcheap talksecret handshakerenegotiation-proofnessevolutionary robustnesscommunication-proofness
Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
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