The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.012zbMath1530.91222OpenAlexW4389166342MaRDI QIDQ6188676

Joo Sung Lee, Seungwon Jeong

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.012

zbMATH Keywords

corebudget feasibilitygroupwise collusion-proofnessreferral networkreferral strategy-proofnessreferrer's dilemmaShill-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Pricing and referrals in diffusion on networks
• Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game
• Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions
• Bilateral Trading in Networks
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentives in Teams
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
• Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
• Package Auctions and Exchanges
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism