Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
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Publication:6188681
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.001zbMath1530.91440MaRDI QIDQ6188681
Publication date: 11 January 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
stabilityconsistencyone-to-one matchingMaskin invarianceother-side singles monotonicityown-side singles monotonicity
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